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RECENT CASES
ANTITRUST LAW-CLAYTON ACT SECTION 5 CONSENT DECREE
ENTERED OVER GOVERNMENT OBJECTION
In a civil antitrust action,1 after defendants had agreed to a consent
decree proposed by the Government, the Justice Department, in accordance
with a new policy 2 to protect the interests of state and local agencies,
notified defendants that they must also agree to a provision enjoining them
from defending any action brought by public bodies arising out of the
alleged violations and instituted prior to the entry of judgment. At the
hearing on defendants' motion to enter the consent decree without this
provision, the Government altered its position, demanding only that the
defendants admit the violations charged so that-the consent decree would
be available as prima facie evidence of the defendants' guilt. the District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted defendants' motion and
held that section 5(a) 3 did not permit the Government to continue costly
litigation merely to benefit certain potential treble damage claimants once
the defendants had consented to all terms necessary to prevent and restrain
the alleged violations.4 United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,
203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
Settlement of antitrust litigation by consent decrees, based on the
Government's inherent power to act in the public interest,5 predates the
IThe action was brought as required by the Sherman Act § 4, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1958). It sought to restrain and prevent an alleged unlawful
conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade and commerce, violative of the
Sherman Act §§ 1-2, as amended, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1958).
2 See Wall Street Journal, March 11, 1960, p. 14, col. 3. The basis of the policy
was the proposition that injury to state and local agencies forms "one element of the
public interest test which guides acceptance or rejection of a consent decree."
2 TRADE REG. REP. 18811.72. The new policy was first applied in three Massa-
chusetts cases without complaint by the defendants. See United States v. Allied
Chemical Corp., 1961 Trade Cas. 77641 (D.C. Mass. 1960); United States v.
Bituminous Concrete Ass'n, 1960 Trade Cas. 77486 (D.C. Mass. 1960) ; United States
v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 77271 (D.C. Mass. 1960).
3 Clayton Act § 5(a), as amended, 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1958):
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter brought by or on behalf
of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant
has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant
under said laws or by the United States under Section 15(a) of this title,
as to all matters respecting which judgment or decree would be an estoppel
as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply
to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken
or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15 (a) of this title.
4 The final consent decree appears at 5 TRADE REG. REP. 70346.
5 See Timherz, Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments, 10 FED.
B.J. 351, 352 (1949).
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passage of section 5 of the Clayton Act. 6 A consent decree is the formal
declaration of a bargain negotiated between the Government and the ac-
cused antitrust violators.7 Nevertheless, courts have treated the decree
not as a contract but rather as a compromise 8 between the parties approved
by the court after a determination that the agreement is in the public
interest. 9 In making this determination, the courts have traditionally either
accepted or rejected the product of the negotiation, avoiding interference
as an active participant 10 by dictating the terms of the agreement. In the
present case, the court's holding that it was empowered to grant a consent
decree without actual approval by the Government 1 diverged from this
attitude of restraint. The court found authority in the intent of Congress
to give every accused antitrust violator an "unqualified right" to avoid the
prima facie evidence sanction of section 5 (a) by pretrial agreement to a
consent decree.' 2
The language of section 5 does not substantiate the court's contention.
The proviso clause refers to consent decrees already "entered" and does
not contemplate a prejudgment "right" guaranteed to alleged antitrust
violators. Neither does the legislative history of the act permit such an
interpretation since section 5 was primarily designed to aid potential anti-
trust plaintiffs whose property or business was injured by illegal combina-
tions.13  After being added by the Conference Committee, 14 the proviso
clause was immediately criticized as a device by which large corporations
could avoid the effective sanction of section 5.15 But its supporters
OThe first use of a consent decree to settle an antitrust action was United
States v. Otis Elevator Co., 1 Decrees & Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases 107
(N.D. Cal. 1906). Congress, in enacting section 5 in 1914 did not specifically pro-
vide for the use of consent decrees. The language of the section, however, indicates
congressional recognition of the Government's power to enter into such decrees. See
SUBCOmm. No. 5, HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., lST SEss., THE
CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (Comm. Print 1959).
7 See Donovan & McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal
Anti-Trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. REv. 885, 915 (1933); Isenbergh & Rubin, Antitrust
Enforcement Through Consent Decrees, 53 HARV. L. REv. 386, 388 (1940) ; Peterson,
Consent Decrees; A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REV.
34, 35 (1949); Comment, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Enforcement-Analysis
and Criticism, 32 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 367, 368 (1960).
8 See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932) ; United States v.
Ford Motor Co., 335 U.S. 303, 322 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
9 See Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 7, at 388; Peterson, supra note 7, at 35.
10 See Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 7, at 408.
11 Only one case has been found in which a court has granted a consent decree
without government consent. See United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co.,
1956 Trade Cas. 72140 (S.D. Ga. 1956).
12 Instant case at 662.
13 See 51 CoNG. REc. 13851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh). The original
House bill, H.R. Res. 15567, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1914) had provided that
final decrees and judgments would be available to private litigants as "conclusive"
evidence of the guilt of antitrust violators; but the Senate, to avoid a possible con-
stitutional infirmity, substituted "prima facie." See S. REV. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9, 45 (1914).
14 Compare id. at 9, with S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1914). The
present section 5 was section 6 of the original House bill.
15 "But when we consider what has been done by the conferees to this section
we find that they have cut out its vitals." 51 CONG. REc. 15825 (1914) (remarks of
19621
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countered that the proviso would save the Government needless litigation
expense by encouraging consent decrees. 16 Thus, consent decree procedure
was intended to secure for the Government, not defendants, an easier and
cheaper mode 17 of dealing with illegal restraints of trade; 18 there is no
indication that it was to be an "unqualified right" of accused antitrust
violators.
The consent decree can also be a supplemental weapon for govern-
mental defense of the public interest. The Government may seek relief
though a consent decree that it could not obtain through litigation.19 Since
the Government's civil and criminal remedies under the antitrust statutes
are frequently inadequate to discourage illegal activities,20 Congress has
provided private treble damage actions as an additional deterrent. 2 1  The
threat of high monetary judgments in these suits is often much more
potent than the threat of government sanctions.2 2  And since the prima
facie provision encourages private treble damage suits by alleviating the
extreme difficulty and cost of proving an antitrust violation, monopolists
Senator Reed); "Why should the private citizen be required to go to the trouble,
the expense, and the delay of traveling over the country to hunt up the evidence in
a case that had commenced against a trust when the trust had already been in court
and admitted the truth of the allegations?" 51 CONG. REc. 16046 (1914) (remarks
of Senator Norris); see 51 CONG. REc. 15938 (1914) (remarks of Senator Nelson).
161 assume that the provisions [(the original enactment included a tem-
porary provision concerning consent decrees pending at the time the bill be-
came law)] had been put in with a view to facilitating the Government to
carry out consent matters which had been entered into in the form of settle-
ment in equity proceedings wherein the defendant had possibly come into court
and agreed upon a decree and thus relieved the Government of the necessity
of taking evidence and the great expense incident thereto.
51 CONG. REc. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis); see 51 CONG. REc. 16276
(1914) (remarks of Representative Webb).
17 It has been estimated that in the years 1935 to 1955, 72% of civil actions
brought by the Government were terminated by consent decrees. Aifey GEN. NAT'L
CoMm. ANTITRUST REP. 360 (1955). Between 1951 and 1957 the average litigated
case took 59.27 months compared to the average consent decree of 32.86 months.
SuDcoMM. No. 5, op. cit. supra note 6, at 9. The cost of the average medium-sized
antitrust action to the Government is $200,000-250,000. Kilgore, Antitrust Judg-
ments and Their Enforcement, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROCEEDINGS 105
(April 1954).
18 For a capsule summary of the congressional proceedings see Twinports Oil
Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 374-76 (D. Minn. 1939). The Justice De-
partment believes that these decrees should be at least as effective as litigation in de-
terring antitrust violations. See Bergson, Enforcing Antitrust, Fortune, Aug. 1949,
p. 117.
19E.g., the Government was able to obtain royalty-free patent licensing through
consent decrees before any court was willing to grant such relief. See SuBcoMm.
No. 5, op. cit. supra note 6, at 19.
2OThe statutes provide that for each indictment a maximum fine of $50,000
shall be imposed. See id. at 23. A fine of this size probably has little deterrent
effect on today's multi-million and billion dollar combines.
21 See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947);
Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) ; Quemos
Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J. 1940);
SUBCOMm. No. 5, op. cit. supra note 6, at 23; Doyle, Treble Damaqes and Counsel
Fees, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROCEEDINCS 142 (AIZ. 1954); Note, Fifty
Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296 (1939).
22 See 51 CONG. REc. 16046 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah); SuBcommir.
No. 5, op. cit. supra note 6, at 22-24. Ninety percent of all treble damage actions
have followed successful government suits. See id. at 23 n.73.
23 See Doyle, supra note 21, at 143; Note, 49 YALE LJ. 284, 296-98 (1939).
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may seek to avoid its impact by agreeing to consent decrees. Thus the
statutory structure provides the Justice Department with strategic flexi-
bility in enforcement. It may seek a consent decree 24 for reasons of cost,
time, difficulty of proof, or facility in achieving desired relief; 25 or it may
choose to litigate either because the defendants have obstructed negotiation
or because it believes that under the particular circumstances a final ad-
judication will more effectively vindicate the antitrust policies. This choice
should be executive rather than judicial.
26
The court in the present case chose to intervene in the negotiation
process in order to determine at what point a fair result bad been attained
rather than to reject the decree and allow the parties to litigate. It may
have believed that the alternative forced on the possibly innocent defendants
-either to accept the Government terms and invite assuredly extensive
liability or to incur the great.expense of an antitrust defense-was unduly
harsh in this case. However, the risks in establishing a precedent for this
type of judicial intervention greatly outweigh the need to relieve particular
defendants from an unfortunate dilemma. By dictating the terms of the
decree, the court abdicates its position as an impartial referee; furthermore,
the court has no adequate basis for substituting its judgment for that of
the Antitrust Division 2 7 since at the consent decree stage, it is only
cognizant of the limited facts presented on the motion to compel government
consent,28 and may be unaware of other factors which perhaps influenced
government strategy.
Frequent judicial participation in consent decree bargaining could
deter the Justice Department from entering into negotiation for fear that
the court might compel government consent to unsatisfactory terms. The
utility of the consent decree as a device for avoiding the expense and delay
of litigation would thus be undermined. Further, court intervention to
eliminate such provisions as sought by the Government in the present case
might tend to encourage antitrust violation since the Government, when it
has strong cases, could preserve the prima facie rule only by full prose-
cution of all such violations-a prohibitively costly and time-consuming
alternative.
24 See note 17 supra.
25 See Isenbergh & Rubin, supra note 7, at 390; Barnes, Settlement by Consent
Judgment, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROCEEDINGS 10 (April 1954) ; Comment,
Regulation of Business-Sherman Act Administration and Enforcement-A Re-
Analysis of Consent Decrees, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 92, 94 (1956).
26 In the instant case, the Government wished to secure for state and local agencies
the advantages provided by the first clause of section 5 while still limiting cost
through settlement. A "proper part of the Government's responsibility [is] to see
that private victims are made whole." Schwartz, The Schwartz Dissent, 8, in Arr'y
GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. (1955).
27 See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
The court refused to grant a consent decree without the consent of the Government,
reasoning that such a decree would be an anomaly since there would be no actual
consent at all. But see United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 1956 Trade
Cas. 72140 (S.D. Ga. 1956), in which the court, without stating its reason, granted a
consent judgment although lackinz government agreement.
28 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra note 27, at 427.
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ANTITRUST LAW-NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE HELD EX-
EMPT FRoM ANTITRUST LAWS WHEN ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF ITS AUTHORITY UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
The New York Stock Exchange granted temporary approval to the
request of a nonmember dealer in over-the-counter securities for private
wire connections with offices of several member firms. "Disclosures of a
derogatory nature" 1 from a routine investigation of the dealer prompted
the Exchange, pursuant-to its constitution, 2 to "request" its members to
discontinue the connections. Dealer was not given a hearing and when
his request for an explanation was refused, he brought suit for treble dam-
ages and injunctive relief pursuant to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act.3 The trial court granted his motion 
4 for partial summary judgment '
on the ground that the Exchange's conduct constituted a concerted refusal
to deal, which it held to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
6 In
reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one
judge dissenting, held that action taken by the Exchange to enforce its
rules within the scope of its authority under the Securities Exchange Act 7
could not be a violation of the Sherman Act. Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 26 (1962)
(No. 150).
The Securities Exchange Act was enacted primarily to promote fair
dealing and protect investors.8 To attain these goals Congress could have
placed full responsibility in a regulatory commission. Instead, Congress
allowed the exchanges to be self-regulating under the overall supervision of
the Securities Exchange Commission in order to foster speedier and more
1 The Exchange's investigation revealed that dealer failed to disclose an interest
in two corporations, that the Department of Defense had suspended the security
clearance of dealer and his wife, that dealer had apparently breached an agreement
involving the exchange of certain shares of stock, and "further disclosures of a
derogatory nature."
2 The Exchange's constitution provides that its Board of Governors "shall have
power to approve or disapprove any application . . . for wire . . . connection be-
tween . . . any member . . . and any non-member, and may require the discontinu-
ance of any such . . . connection." NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE: CONSTITUTION
AND RULES, art. III, § 6, 2 CCH N.Y. STOCK ExcH. GUIDE 1f 1056 (1962).
3 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958) : "Any person who shall be injured
in his business . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1958) : "Any person . . . [or] firm . . .
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . ... "
4 Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 60 M IcH.
L. REv. 213.
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).
626 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
748 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78 (1958).
8 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1934) ; H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) ; see Gadsby, Historical Development of the SEC-The Govern-
ment View, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 6 (1959); Landis, The Legislative History of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
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effective operation.9 The rules of the exchanges are thus important instru-
ments of congressional policy. As a check, every national securities ex-
change is required to file its rules and constitution with the SEC,1' which
is empowered to recommend and, if necessary, impose amendments to them
to protect investors, or to insure fair dealing or fair administration of the
exchange.1  When the SEC has not exercised this power over a period of
years, it seems fair to conclude, as did the present court, that the Commis-
sion has approved the exchange's rules,' 2 here, the one authorizing
severance of wire service.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has declared in dictum
that a stock exchange has the duty to enforce its SEC-approved rules.13
The trial court in the present case decided that even if the New York Stock
Exchange had to enforce its rules, the Exchange exceeded its powers in
controlling conduct unrelated- to the listed securities business.14 Although
the rule authorizing severance of wire connections is worded permissively,
it appears that the Exchange had a duty to act in the present case. Since
these connections are often used by nonmembers to purchase listed secu-
rities through member firms,15 the Exchange, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of self-discipline of members' listed securities activities, must investi-
gate nonmember applicants for wire service and must deny their applica-
tions or sever existing connections when necessary to promote fair dealing
or to protect investors. Were these regulatory activities merely discretion-
ary, the Exchange could not be held accountable and the enforcement of
the Securities Exchange Act would not be assured in this segment of
listed securities marketing.
In other regulated fields Congress has specifically provided exemptions
from the antitrust laws in many areas of potential conflict between those
laws and congressional regulatory objectives. 16 The trial court in the
instant case attached significance to the lack of such an exemption in the
9 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2a SFSS.,
STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION 6-8 (Comm. Print 1934), quoted in Brief for the
SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 8, instant case.
1048 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78f(a)(3) (1958).
1148 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78s(b) (1958).
12 Instant case at 719.
13 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F2.d 238, 244 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. dened, 323
U.S. 737 (1944):
There can be no doubt that . . . [the Securities Exchange Act] places a
duty upon the Stock Exchange to enforce the rules and regulations [requiring
disciplinary measures to enforce fair dealings] . . . . If all that . . . [this
requirement] meant was that every exchange should pass token regulations,
incapable of enforcement except at the wish of the exchange itself, there
would have been no purpose for . . . [the requirement].
14 196 F. Supp. at 221, 222.
15 See id. at 212. For an indication of the importance of these transactions, see
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1962, p. 46, col. 3.
16 E.g., The Interstate Commerce Act provides:
Parties to any agreement approved by the [Interstate Commerce] Commis-
sion . . . are . . . relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws with
respect to the making of such agreement, and with respect to the carrying
1962]
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Securities Exchange Act.17 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit cannot justly
be accused of an undue judicial assumption of the legislative function in
finding an implied exemption in the present case. At the time of the Act's
passage, it was taken for granted that the exchanges had certain monop-
olistic features,' and the SEC now takes the position that an exemption
"provision with respect to registered exchanges would have been unneces-
sary." 19 It would be absurd to punish under one federal law action taken
pursuant to another. Therefore, Congress could not have intended to
subject to the antitrust laws activities of exchanges which effectuate the
Securities Exchange Act. Moreover, an antitrust exemption conditioned
on the correctness or even the reasonableness of a particular action by an
exchange would threaten the exchange with liability for treble damages
for a misapplication of its powers and might thereby inhibit its enforcement
of the Securities Exchange Act. Consequently, the present court seems
justified in holding that the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of an ex-
change's action taken pursuant to its congressional mandate does not affect
its immunity20
Nevertheless, the instant case does not give the Exchange complete
license to violate the antitrust laws. If the Exchange should exceed its
authority under the Securities Exchange Act and use the rule authorizing
severance of wire service so as to stifle competition, an aggrieved dealer
can petition the SEC to compel amendment of that Exchange rule.
21 If
the SEC refuses, or if dealer is denied wire service even under the amended
rule, judicial review is apparently available.22 A court could then issue
an injunction, thus restoring dealer's wire service without saddling the
Exchange with treble damages.
out of such agreement in conformity with its provisions and in conformity
with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commission.
62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1958). See generally Hale & Hale, Com-
petition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962).
17 196 F. Supp. at 220, citing United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum). Exemption in the instant case arises from a conflict
between the antitrust laws and the self-regulation of exchanges provided for under
the Securities Exchange Act. Since the Morgan case did not deal with any self-
disciplinary procedures, Judge Medina's statement that Congress intended no ex-
emptions under that Act must be considered too broad to be applicable here.
18 See Hearings on S. 3255 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 7 (1938). See also Westwood & Howard, Self-Govern-
ment in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CONTM ZP. PROB. 518, 519 (1952).
19 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, p. 12, instant case.
20 Instant case at 720-21.
21 See In the Matter of Rules of New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270, 287-88
(1941) (alternative holding). In this case the SEC held that enforcement of a rule
adopted by the New York Stock Exchange was in violation of the Securities Exchange
Act and would impose an unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce. It there-
fore ordered an amendment to insure fair administration of the Exchange under 48
Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1958).
22 See Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review II, 71 HARV. L. Ray. 769, 800-08
(1958) ; cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). In order to exhaust
his administrative remedies, the dealer should seek SEC relief before petitioning for
judicial review of the Exchange's allegedly arbitrary action. However, the present
case apparently suggests that the dealer may seek judicial review directly. Instant
case at 721. Presumably, the court is assuming that no administrative remedies
are available.
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FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-FEDERAL JURY
TRIAL OF MARITIME CLAIM FOR MAINTENANCE ANfD CURE PROPERLY
DENIED WIEN JOINED WITH CLAIM UNDER JONES ACT
A seaman brought a civil action in federal court against his employer,
United States Lines, on two counts, the first for damages under the Jones
Act,1 and the second for maintenance and cure. Plaintiff asserted federal
jurisdiction under the Jones Act,2 and demanded a jury trial.2  The first
count was tried by jury; the second count, by the court alone. After a
judgment dismissing the Jones Act claim and awarding a small sum for
maintenance and cure, plaintiff appealed alleging that his second claim
should have been tried by jury. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc,4
affirmed, but the court divided three ways on the central issue. A majority
of six judges held that plaintiff had no right to jury trial on the maintenance
and cure claim, but four of those judges reasoned that jury trial would be
improper while the remaining two considered submission to the jury
discretionary with the trial judge. The three dissenting judges maintained
that jury trial was mandatory. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co.,
306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962), petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3103
(U.S. Sept. 26, 1962) (No. 463).
Under the general maritime law an injured seaman had two remedies
in admiralty-one for maintenance and cure, the other for damages for
unseaworthiness.5 However, the negligence of the master or crew was
not actionable until the passage of the Jones Act.6 Since personal injuries
sustained while working on a vessel normally give rise to all three claims
-negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and
cure--, seamen have been permitted to join them in one civil action in the-
district courts, rather than proceed separately in admiralty on the maritime
1 Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958) (this
section is popularly called "The Jones Act"). The first count embodied claims for
negligence of the crew, unseaworthiness, and negligent failure to provide maintenance
and cure.
2 Since the apparent federal jurisdictional provision in the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), has been interpreted as merely designating proper
venue, Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1924), federal jurisdiction
actually was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), as a case arising under the laws of
the United States.3 The Jones Act provides that the seaman may, "at his election, maintain an
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury .... " 41 Stat. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
4 The case was heard and decided en banc in compliance with Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §46(c) (1958) in Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v.
Western Pac. P.R., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953): "[D]eterminations en banc are indi-
cated whenever it seems likely that a majority of all the active judges would reach
a different result than the panel assigned to hear a case or which has heard it." See
generally Note, En Bauc Procedure it; the Federal Courts of Appeals, 111 U. PA.
L. RFv. 220 (1962).
G See The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). For an historical discussion of
these doctrines see GrLmoRE & BLACk, ADMIRALTY §§ 6-6 to -13, 6-38 to -44 (1957).
6 See Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 134 (1928) ; GImoRE & BLAcK,
ADMIRALTY § 6-20 (1957).
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claims.7  The "saving to suitors" clause of the admiralty grant of original
federal jurisdiction 8 permits seamen to bring actions at law in the state
courts,9 and entitles them to jury trial of all maritime claims properly in-
voking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 10 Since a Jones
Act civil action is tried by jury in federal court," an unseaworthiness claim
joined with it generally is also tried to the jury.12 But the question of
jury trial for non-diversity maintenance and cure claims was unsettled.
13
Indeed, the division of opinion in the present case, although cogently ar-
ticulating the divergent considerations, will provide little guidance for the
district courts.
A plurality of the court 14 interpreted Rule 39 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 15 to preclude a binding jury verdict on any claim not
triable by a jury as of right. This interpretation is supported by the
language of the rule, the notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, 1 and
7 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-81 (1959).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are other-
wise entitled. . . ." The original admiralty grant read "saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to
give it." Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 76.
9 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) ; Engel v. Daven-
port, 271 U.S. 33 Z1926); Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1871); The
Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 643-44 (1869).
10 See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355
(1962) ; Leon v. Galceran, supra note 9; The Belfast, supra note 9, at 644.
11 See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). Negligent failure to pay
maintenance and cure, which aggravates the seaman's sickness, creates a "personal
injury" under the Jones Act. Remuneration for the seaman's cash outlay, however,
is only recoverable in a claim for maintenance and cure separate from the Jones Act.
See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1932).
12The gravamen of an action under the Jones Act is personal injury based on
negligence, Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928) (semble). A claim
for unseaworthiness will be barred unless it is asserted with the Jones Act claim,
Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927); usually both claims go to the
jury. Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1000 (1959); McCarthy v. American E. Corp., 175 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949); cf. Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir.
1952).
13 See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381 (1959).
14 Opinion of Friendly, J., in which Chief Judge Lumbard and Judges Moore
and Kaufman concurred.
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 39:
(b) By the court.... [N]otwithstanding the failure of a party to
demand a jury in an action in which such demand might have been made
of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury
of any or all issues.
(c) Advisory jury and trial by consent. In all actions not triable of
right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any
issue with an advisory jury or . . . the court, with the consent of both
parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as
if trial by jury had been a matter of right.
16 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. App. following FED. R.
CIrv. P. 39 (1958). The Committee cited rules of eleven states to support the dis-
cretionary power of the court to send issues of fact to the jury. Only in Minnesota
was a jury verdict binding on issues submitted by the court in its discretion. First
Nat'l Bank of Lakefield v. Quevli, 182 Minn. 238, 234 N.W. 318 (1931).
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explanatory lectures by the Committee immediately after the adoption of
the rules.17 The first published draft of the Federal Rules, which em-
powered the trial court judge to submit any claim for a binding jury
verdict,I8 was changed to virtually the present wording 19 in order to con-
form to earlier chancery practice and to reflect the opinion of the equity
bar that a judge should not be permitted to send any equitable issues to a
jury for binding verdict.2 0 Thus, Judge Friendly, writing the plurality
opinion, was on firm ground in deciding that only a claim triable to a jury




Counsel conceded that jury trial of the maintenance and cure claim is
not constitutionally guaranteed,2 but argued that since such a claim is
treated as "pendent" 23 to the Jones Act claim for jurisdictional purposes,
it should be similarly treated for purposes of jury trial.2 This contention,
however, has been rejected in other areas of pendent jurisdiction. 25  In
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,28 which held that mari-
time claims joined with Jones Act claims were properly within district court
civil jurisdiction, the Court did not reach the essentially different question of
whether those maritime claims should be tried by jury.27  Moreover, many
of the arguments for one mode of trial derive from conditions that led to
'7ABA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, 228-29
(1938); Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess., ser. 17, at 118 (1938).
1
8
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 83 (1936) provided in Rule 46 (now Rule 39): "In all
actions, the court may at any time, in its discretion or upon motion by any party,
order any issue or issues to be tried by jury, although no right to trial by jury
exists either because not originally demandable or because of waiver by the
parties ... "
19ADVIsORY CoMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROPOSED RULES OF CIvrL
PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS, 99-100 (1937).
20 Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 629, 632 (1937).
2 1 The compulsion of Rule 39 leaves only two alternatives: to require jury trial
for maintenance and cure claims, as the dissent does, or to rule out jury trial for
those claims, as the plurality does. The position of the concurring judges that sub-
mission to the jury should be discretionary with the trial judge runs counter to the
statutory force of the Rules. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941).
2 2 Instant case at 470-71.
23The term is from Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 380-81 (1959). Since a claim under the general maritime law neither arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
supra, nor is removable absent diversity of citizenship, see id. at 363; Pate v. Standard
Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952), maintenance and cure is triable to a
jury as of right only if pendent claims must be tried in the same mode as the principal
claim (here the Jones Act), or if maintenance and cure can properly be considered
as within the Jones Act cause of action.
24 Instant case at 468-69.
25 See Kurland, The Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction,
73 HARV. L. REv. 817, 833-50 (1960).
26358 U.S. 354 (1959).
2 7 Id. at 380-81.
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the practice of equitable clean-up 28 which has now been repudiated in the
federal courts 2 9 because the merger of law and equity permits simultaneous
trial to court and jury.30 Thus, there is no basis for extending the ra-
tionale of pendent jurisdiction to require one mode of trial when that
jurisdiction is exercised.
Judge Clark, however, did not ground his dissent on the "pendent"
rationale, but on the unitary nature of the underlying claim: since "all the
claims are based on the same cause of action," they should be treated as
one.3 1 But in other instances in which various rights and remedies are
tried as a unitary cause of action, uniform legal consequences follow which
could not follow here. 32  A release on one such claim traditionally bars
subsequent prosecution of the others, but a maintenance and cure release
would not have this effect since the theoretical basis for that form of
recovery is so foreign to that of unseaworthiness and Jones Act negli-
gence.3 Furthermore, neither a Jones Act claim 3 4 nor an unseaworthiness
claim joined with it is removable from a state court,3 5 whereas a mainte-
nance and cure claim is removable if diversity exists.36 Treatment of the
maritime claim as one cause of action-in the traditional sense-would
disjoint these complex relationships.
Judge Clark's discussion of cause of action, however, emphasized
identity of factual situations rather than similarity of legal rights.37 This
approach of requiring a unitary mode of trial without altering other legal
consequences is supported by prominent commentators because of the
difficulties inherent in the use of two triers of fact.38 However, the most
serious of these difficulties--overlap of damages 3 9-- can be alleviated by
utilizing the mandatory Jones Act jury as an advisory jury, subject to
28 See Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952) ; McCullough v.
Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1961). See generally Levin, Equitable
Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951).
2
9Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
30 See ibid. (semble) ; Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 813 (1948).
31 Instant case at 476. See generally note 38 infra.
3 2 Compare Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), with Pacific
S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).
33 Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928). Compare note 12 supra.
3428 U.S.C. § 1445 (1958), Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir. 1952).
35 Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., supra note 34; cf. Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
36 Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., supra note 34; cf. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peter-
son, 278 U.S. 130, 138 (1928).
3 7 Instant case at 476.
38 See GIxzREo & BLAcK, ADmRALTY § 6-9, at 262 (1957); 5 MooRE, FEaER
PR.cric. 38.35[4], at 284 (2d ed. 1951); Currie, The Silver Oar and All That:
A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1, 5 (1959) ; Kurland, The Romero
Case and Some Problems of Federal Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. RFv. 817, 849-50 (1960).
See also Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
39 See instant case at 475-76, and cases cited therein. Another difficulty is the
possibility of collateral estoppel for issues of fact initially determined by the jury.
Id. at 476.
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judicial supervision,40 to consider the maintenance and cure claim. This
solution is more practical than Judge Clark's alternative since it would
provide necessary checks on jury liberality in an area of recovery which
is predicated solely on actual monetary loss. 4 1  Furthermore, Judge
Clark's approach might engender considerable confusion in distinguishing
between the "identic fact situation" theory, the only effect of which is a
unitary mode of trial, and the traditional cause of action concept, which has
more far-reaching consequences.
RATE REGUIJATION-EUAnwATIowq oF ImPORT-EXpoRT
FREIGHT RATES DESPITE DISTA-CE DIFFERENTIAL HELD NOT
VoLATIvE oF INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT
Railroads serving the "northern tier" 1 ports proposed reduced rate
schedules to many points in the midwest which would put total charges for
shipping through the "northern tier" ports on a parity with those of the
closer "southern tier." 2 The Interstate Commerce Commission, finding
that a rate structuie which failed to take account of the distance differ-
ential 3 constituted an undue preference violative of section 3(1) of the
Interstate Commerce Act,4 ordered cancellation* of the proposed rates.5
On appeal, a three-judge district court held that there was no violation of
section 3(1) and enjoined enforcement of the ICC order. Boston & Me.
R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962),
Section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act 6 permits railroads to
meet competition through voluntary rate adjustments, within reasonable
limits.7 The Commission must approve a proposed rate schedule unless
costs or other transportation factors, including competition,8 require main-
tenance of the existing rates.9 Rates which are preferential to particular
40 Pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 49.
41 See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) (by implication).
1 Boston, New York City, Portland, and Albany.
2 Baltimore, Hampton Roads, and Philadelphia.
3 The average short line distance from the affected territory to Baltimore is 698
miles; the distance to Boston is 921 miles. Equalization of Rates at No. Ati. Ports,
$11 I.C.C. 689, 715 (1960).
454 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §3(1) (1958).
5 Equalization of Rates at No. Atl. Ports, 311 I.CC. 689 (1960), aff'd on recon-
sideration, 314 I.C.C. 185 (1961).
6 44 Stat. 1447 (1927), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1958).
7United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 505 (1935);
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627, 636 (1933) ; New York Cent. R.R.
v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 394, 398 (D. Mass.), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 890
(1951).
8 Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 592 (1949).
9 New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 394 (D. Mass.), aff'd
per curiam, 342 U.S. 890 (1951).
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localities may be approved only if cost or competitive factors require such
preference to maintain or increase revenues. 10
Since the ICC was directed by statute to approve the lower rates, if
lawful, the only question in the present case was whether the Commission's
conclusion that the rates were unreasonably preferential in violation of
section 3(1) rested on a rational basis.11  In making that adjudication,
however, the court implemented its own standard of reasonableness of
preference, rather than remanding to the Commission for a determination
of reasonableness in accordance with the court's decision.
The ICC finding of undue preference was based solely on the fact that
the reduced rates did not reflect the substantially greater shipping distances
to the northern ports. 12 But equal rates for unequal hauls have seldom
been held unreasonably preferential per se. The Commission has stated
that considerable disregard of distance is characteristic of all port adjust-
ments 13 and has -frequently allowed carriers with relatively circuitous
routes to equalize rates with those of direct route carriers. 14  Failure to
take account of distance in ratemaking is undesirable only when it clearly
prejudices particular shippers,15 railroads, or ports, or fosters economic
waste in the system. Proposed rates that will make additional competitive
carriage available to the shippers and will attract more traffic to ports
burdened by overcapacity should not be canceled solely because of a distance
differential.
Since sound ratemaking begins with comparative cost determinations,
an obvious ground for holding equal rates for unequal distances to be
unduly preferential is that they fail to reflect the extra costs of longer
freight hauls.'6 However, as a matter of legitimate managerial discretion, a
10 United States v. Illirfois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 515 (1924) ; Manufacturers Ry.
v United States, 246 U.S. 457 (1918); see LAKE, DISCRIMINATION By RAILROADS
AND OTHFR PUBLIC UrILITIEs 221 (1947); cf. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States,
289 U.S. 627 (1933).
11 ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912). See generally 4 DAVIS,
ADMiNiSTATrw LAW TREATISE § 30.05 (1958).
32 Equalization of Rates at No. Atl. Ports, 314 I.C.C. 185, 198 (1961).
'3 See, e.g., Equalization of Rates at No. Atl. Ports, 311 I.C.C. 689, 715-16
(1960) ; Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R.R., 159 I.C.C. 691, 696
(1929). But see Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 258 (D. Md.),
modified, 355 U.S. 175 (1957), in which the court relied on unequal distances to over-
rule a Commission order approving equalized rates on imported iron ore moving from
Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York to the central states. The rationale of that
decision, however, seems to have been the court's conclusion that the Commission
had failed to give due consideration to evidence that parity rates would greatly
impair Baltimore's competitive ability. In the instant case, even under the differential
rate structure there was considerable disregard of distance between particular points.
See instant case at 832.
14 See Lumber from the So. & Southwest, 198 I.C.C. 753, 755 (1934) ; Rates from,
to and Between Points in So. Territory, 191 I.C.C. 507, 546 (1933).
15 Group rates, for example, clearly prejudice the nearer shippers. See Note,
Group Rates: A Questionable Feature of the Railroad Rate Structure, 98 U. PA. L.
REv. 204 (1949).
16 See WILSON, NEW DEPARTURES IN FREIGHT RATE MAKING 16 (1948).
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railroad may elect to lower particular rates to meet or slightly exceed out-
of-pocket costs in order to tap new sources of traffic.17 In the present
case, the potential diversion to the northern railroads of traffic that can
more profitably be carried by the southern railroads might increase the
overall cost of the shipping involved. On the other hand, the new rate
schedule might improve the financial position of the northern railroads
and ports and produce a more competitive system.' 8 The ICC is not
justified in inhibiting competition by preventing high cost carriers from
cutting their charges to a point still above costs in order to attract addi-
tional traffic. Indeed, if high cost carriers could never lower their rates,
low cost carriers would have a perpetual monopoly. Since low cost car-
riers can always further readjust their rates, as the southern railroads in
the present case could easily have done,19 the proposed rates need not
immutably alter the relative .competitive positions. A downward spiral of
rate cutting would be unlikely, since further competitive reduction of rates
by the northern railroads would be neither permissible nor economically
feasible.20
Beyond cost considerations, the Commission's finding of undue prefer-
ence may have been motivated by a desire to avoid the supposed diseconomy
of enabling the distant northern ports to compete for traffic on the same
terms as the closer southern ports. But equal competitive opportunity for
all North Atlantic ports seems more desirable than unlimited exploitation
of inherent cost advantages. Under the proposed rates, the northern ports,
at present little-used for bulk shipments, might attract sufficient traffic to
absorb their existing excess capacity and prevent further deterioration of
rolling stock, thereby lessening congestion and resultant inefficiency in the
southern ports 21 and postponing systemically wasteful expansion in already
busy areas. Opening all North Atlantic ports to shippers at equal rates
would promote the National Transportation Policy 2 of developing and
preserving an economically sound transportation §ystem, adequate to meet
the nation's commercial and defense needs.
Equal opportunity for all North Atlantic ports was the purpose of the
original rate differential. 23 In the nineteenth century ocean rates were
17 If a railroad attracts enough new traffic at a lower rate, the overall contribution
to fixed costs will be greater, and the burden of the fixed costs will be more evenly
distributed. See generally Note, Minimum-Rate Regulation by the Interstate Com-
inerce Commivsion, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 762 (1960); Morton, The Impact of Competi-
tion in Common Carrier Ratemaking, 28 ICC PRAc. J. 693 (1961).
18 See Equalization of Rates at No. AtI. Ports, 311 I.C.C. 689, 717 (1960).
19 See notes 26, 28 infra and accompanying text.
20 Because the proposed rates are already at or only slightly above costs. See
41 Stat. 475 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(5) (1958); 44 Stat. 1447 (1927), as
amended, 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1958); 48 Stat. 220 (1933), as amended, § 15a(2)
(1958); Chicago & E.I.R.R. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D. Ind.
1952), aff'd per curiam, 344 U.S. 917 (1953).
21 See instant case at 835.
2254 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. Preamble (1958).
23 Instant case at 833. See generally Harbeson, The North Atlantic Port Dif-
ferentials, 46 Q.J. EcoN. 644 (1932).
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lower to the northern ports than to the southern ports; in 1877, by
private agreement among the railroads, the northern rail rates were cor-
respondingly raised to equalize overall rail-ocean transportation charges
through both tiers. Examining the rate structure in 1905,2 the Commis-
sion found parity not unduly preferential because it tended to distribute
the available traffic through all of the ports. Gradual equalization of ocean
rates upset this parity,2 which the rates proposed in the present case at-
tempted to restore.
The ICC apparently feared that the northeastern railroads' proposal
would necessarily freeze the rates at parity. 6 Although this conclusion
might supply a rational basis for holding that the proposed rates unlawfully
disregarded the distance advantages of the southern ports,2 7 it was unwar-
ranted in the circumstances of this case. Upon allowance of the proposed
rate reduction, should the southern railroads suffer inordinate traffic di-
version, they could reassert their distance-cost advantage by proposing
lower rates. If the new differential were closely .related to cost advantages
and no lower than competitively necessary, approval of the lower southern
rates would be assured unless the Commission found that the wider
choice of ports and more vigorous competition justified maintenance of
the parity relationship 28 Of course, if the Commission is correct in its
finding that little traffic will be diverted,29 the southern railroads, by lower-
ing their rates, would lose more revenue on existing traffic than they could
recoup by regaining a small amount of lost traffic.
In any event, the northern railroads were not seeking an unalterable
rate schedule, and the implicit Commission objection that parity would
freeze the North Atlantic port rates ignored the possibility that the southern
railroads might successfully reassert their distance advantage by lowering
rates. Reversal of the ICC in the present case effectuates the proposition
that, absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, section 3(1) does not
immunize carriers with distance advantages from the pressure of otherwise
lawful price competition.
:2 4 Differential Freight Rates to and from No. Atl. Ports, 11 I.C.C. 13 (1905).
25 The northern ports, being closer to European cities, would be favored by a
requirement that ocean rates, as well as rail rates, must reflect differences in cost
and distance.
26 See instant case at 837.
27 The ICC might have concluded that the National Transportation Policy pro-
hibits a rate structure which fails to reflect the "inherent advantages" of each carrier.
Although the Policy is limited to intermodal competition, similar considerations seem
relevant to intramodal competition. See 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. Preamble
(1958).
28 See Note, Minimum-Rate Regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
73 HARv. L. Rnv. 762, 773-75 (1960). The Commission has the power to prevent
needless dissipation of carrier revenues. See Iron Ore, Ex Labrador, Canada, to
Youngstown, Ohio, Area, 302 I.C.C. 109, 117 (1957).
2 9 Equalization of Rates at No. Atl. Ports, 314 I.C.C. 185, 198 (1961).
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STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS-SECTION¢ 4 oF THE Nos-
LAGUXRDIA ACT HELD To PROHIBIT FEDERAL COURT IN-UNCTION
OF STRIKE OVER AN ARBITRABLE GRIEVANCE
Plaintiff-employer, Sinclair Refining Co., brought suit in federal dis-
trict court under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act' to
enjoin defendant union from continuing intermittent work stoppages 2
protesting grievances that the employer contended were proper subjects
of arbitration under the contract 3 between employer and union.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 5 dismissal 6 on the
ground that the federal courts are denied jurisdiction by section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 7 to give the injunctive relief sought. The Supreme
Court also affirmed, holding that section 301 did not impliedly repeal the
anti-injunction provisions of section 4 to permit an employer to enjoin a
union's breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962).
' Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958):
Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship
of the parties.
2The allegations in the complaint listed nine separate occurrences, of which the
following are typical: approximately 6 employees stopped work for one day, in sup-
port of an asserted grievance concerning the removal of a machinist from their area;
approximately 73 employees stopped work for one hour in support of an assertion
that riggers could do certain work with machinists; approximately 43 employees
refused to work for 8 hours in support of an asserted grievance; approximately 999
employees stopped work over an asserted grievance by 3 riggers that they were
docked $2.19 in pay. See instant case at 199 n.10.
3 The contract banned strikes or work stoppages "for any cause which is or may
be the subject of a grievance . . ." defined to include "any difference regarding
wages, hours or working conditions between the parties . . . ." Detailed pro-
cedures are provided for the presentation and processing of grievances through
various levels of union and employer management. If not settled, the grievance
eventually reaches an impartial third party, whose decision is final and binding on
the parties. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 250 (1962).
4 The complaint also contained two other counts claiming damages first, against
the union for breach of the no-strike clause and second, against twenty-four individual
union officials for inducing breaches of the labor contract. The union's motion to
stay the first count was denied by the district court, and the denial affirmed on appeal.
Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961). The union's motion to
dismiss the second count was granted by the district court. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit reversed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
circuit court and dismissed the count. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238
(1962).
5Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
6 See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1960), relying
on Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
7 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
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Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act---enacted in 1947
to increase union responsibility 8 and provide mutual enforceability 9 of
arbitration agreements-extends federal jurisdiction to "suits for violation
of contracts . . . ." between union and employer.' 0 However, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act "-passed in 1932 to cure excessive judicial inter-
ference with the labor movement-allows federal court injunctions in
"labor disputes" only under the stringent procedures and standards speci-
fied in section 7; 12 section 4 enumerates certain acts, including strikes,
that federal courts may never enjoin. 13 In Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills,'4 the Supreme Court sustained a lower court order compelling
employer performance of an arbitration agreement, holding that this in-
junction need not comply with the procedural requirements of section 7
of Norris-LaGuardia. The Court relied on analogous supercessions of
Norris-LaGuardia requirements in railway labor cases,' 5 and stated that
the congressional -policy to foster no-strike agreements required enforce-
ment of the employer agreement to arbitrate, which is the quid pro quo for
the union's no-strike promise.' 6 In Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago R. & I.R.R. (Chicago River) ,' 7 a railway labor case decided the
same day as Lincoln Mills, the Court allowed injunction of a strike despite
s See H.R. Doc. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947) ; 93 CONG. REc. 3656-57
(1947) (remarks of Representatives Barden and Hartley) ; S. Rur. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
9 See Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 496, 501 (1958).
10 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958). The act sets forth the con-
gressional policy that conferences and collective bargaining are the most suitable means
to industrial peace. 61 Stat. 152 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1958).
1147 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958). Section 2 sets
forth the congressional policy that the individual workers interests will best be
furthered by limiting the federal courts' injunctive power over collective bargaining
and other mutual activities. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
1247 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958) : "No court of the United States
. . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in a . . . labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions
of this chapter . . . ." Section 7 requires that the federal courts issue labor in-
junctions only after a proper hearing on findings that unlawful acts have been
threatened by the defendant, that irreparable injury will follow, that denial of relief
will be more harmful to the complainant than its granting will be to the defendant,
that there is no adequate remedy at law, and that public officers are unwilling or
unable to protect the complainant's property. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1958).
13 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958):
No court . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
. . . injunction . . . to prohibit any person . . . from doing, whether
singly or in concert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to
perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment.
14353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15 Id. at 458.
16 Id. at 455:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does
more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations.
It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agree-
ments on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace
can be best obtained only in that way.
17353 U.S. 30 (1957).
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the explicit prohibitions of section 4; supercession of Norris-LaGuardia
was justified on the ground that the arbitration required by the Railway
Labor Act was a "reasonable alternative" 18 to the union's strike weapon.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further effectuated the congressional
intent to make arbitration the "kingpin" of federal labor policy.19
A leading authority on labor law has characterized the Norris-
LaGuardia Act as "the high watermark of the philosophy that law has no
useful role to play in labor relations." 0 More recent labor legislation,
however, has abandoned this laissez faire approach and reinstated equitable
judicial enforcement as a vital part of federal labor policy.21 Therefore, it
is now inappropriate, as the Supreme .Court has often recognized,2 to
construe Norris-LaGuardia so strictly as to prevent the implementation of
later federal labor policies.
In enacting the Taft-Hartley Act both houses of Congress sought to
foster enforcement of no-strike agreements; 3 the House bill would have
repealed Norris-LaGuardia to allow private injunctive remedies,24 whereas
the Senate version preferred NLRB prohibition of breach.& 2 5 Both pro-
posals were rejected by the Conference Committee," which drafted sec-
tion 301 to allow "suits" by private litigants, saying that enforcement would
be left "to the usual processes of the law." 27  Even conceding that Con-
18 Id. at 41. Other provisions of Norris-LaGuardia, including section 7, bad
been superseded in prior railway labor cases. See Brotherhood of RR. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 774 (1952) ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
338 U.S. 232, 237-40 (1949) ; Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 562 (1937).
See also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960),
109 U. PA. L. RFv. 293.
'9 See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). All three cases
emphasized that complete effectuation of the federal arbitration policy can only be
obtained when the collective agreement contains provisions for binding arbitration
of all grievances and when all strikes are prohibited. Mr. Justice Brennan noted
that the no-strike agreement was not necessary to the results in these cases. See
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., supra at 573 (concurring opinion). The
Court has even read a no-strike agreement into an arbitration contract not expressly
containing one. See Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
20 Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RocKy MT.
L. REv. 247, 253 (1957).
21 Id. at 254.
22 See, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957) ; Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 40 (1957) ; cases cited
note 18 supra.
23 See note 8 supra.
24 See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947) (as passed in the House).
25 See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., lst Sess. §8(b)(5) (1947) (as passed in the
Senate).
26 See H.R. CONF. RaP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Senator Taft,
reporting the results of the conference, noted that "the conferees . . . rejected the
repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 93 CONG. Rac. 6603 (1947).
27H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947). Senator Taft's
statement that section 301 only "conferred a right of action for damages . . . " 93
CONG. REc. 6600 (1947), was not viewed as controlling in Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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gress rejected express repeal of Norris-LaGuardia 28 does not compel the
conclusion that Congress intended Norris-LaGuardia to apply with full
force in derogation of the policies articulated in the Taft-Hartley Act. 9
Congress may have thought that outright repeal of Norris-LaGuardia as to
all contract disputes governed by section 301 would be too hazardous and
politically unwise; it may have intended to leave to the courts the inter-
pretation of the extent to which equitable remedies should be available in
"suits" under 301. This conclusion is reinforced by the action of Congress
when it attempted to limit the available remedies; section 303 30 was
originally drafted to repeal Norris-LaGuardia, 31 but Congress instead
imposed an express limitation to actions for damages.32 This solution was
equally available had Congress wished to preclude all possibility of judicial
supercession of Norris-LaGuardia under section 301. Thus, the word
"suits" may well have been employed to permit judicial choice of the best
means for effectuating congressional arbitration policy.
The departure from the laissez faire philosophy of Norris-LaGuardia
renders anachronistic the present majority's reliance - on the dogma that
the broad language and legislative history of the act preclude narrowing
by judicial construction.3 The Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Mills
is precedent for narrow construction to permit implementation of federal
arbitration policy, and it is inappropriate to reverse that course in the
present case. To distinguish Lincoln Mills because it dealt only with the
procedural requirements of section 7 whereas the present case involves
an injunction of activity specifically protected by section 4 is to recognize
28 See instant case at 210; NLRB v. Drivers' Union, 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1960).
29 See Girouard v. U.S., 328 U.S. 61 (1946) ; MISHKIN & MORRIS, ON LAW IN
COURTS 309 (1961).
30 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958).
31 See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12(c) (1947) (as reported).
32 See 93 CONG. REC. 4887-5076 (1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 42, 66 (1947). However, three sections expressly repealed Norris-LaGuardia.
61 Stat. 146, 155, 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), 178(b), 186(e) (1958). Of these
only 61 Stat. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1958), deals with suits by private
litigants. This provision allows the court to restrain bribery, a crime punishable by
imprisonment. This repeals Norris-LaGuardia in a narrow area, and does not present
the same problems that would be raised by total repeal for all contract actions under
section 301.
33 Instant case at 202-03. See also Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley
Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940); Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948 (3d
Cir. 1939). The only cases that have limited the effect of the broad Norris-LaGuardia
requirements have harmonized conflicting federal labor statutes. See Syres v. Oil
Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,
338 U.S. 232 (1949); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
34 See Note, Labor Injunctions and Judge Made Labor Law: The Contemporary
Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.. 70, 95 (1960). The act promulgated the
laissez faire philosophy that labor disputes are best settled by economic competition,
without government restraints on employer or employee. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932);
Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 72
HARV. L. REV. 354, 356 (1958). It applies to both employers and employees. See
§ 7, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958) ; S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1932).
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a distinction in no way contemplated by Congress.as In enacting section
301, Congress meant to give employers some means of enforcing union
contractual promises; the union right to sue under 301 was regarded as
purely secondary.36 The present case emasculates employer recourse to
judicial enforcement of labor contracts while union remedies remain un-
affected by language in section 7 that is as clear and unequivocal as the
language in section 4.37 Moreover, the Court had previously construed
section 4 narrowly in order to effectuate congressional policy in the Chicago
River Railway Labor Act case. The Court distinguishes this case 38 on the
grounds that the history of the Railway Labor Act was devoid of any
attempt to expressly repeal Norris-LaGuardia and that the act itself set
up the arbitration machinery3 9 Nevertheless, the equivocal legislative
history of attempted repeal can be viewed as more conclusive than no
attempt at all. Congress may have chosen a middle ground by refusing
either expressly to repeal Norris-LaGuardia or to limit actions under 301
to those for damages; the Railway Labor Congress seemed unaware of
these alternatives, possibly because the Railway Labor Act was passed so
soon after Norris-LaGuardia that the impact of the latter act was not
realized. Furthermore the "reasonable alternative" rationale advanced in
Chicago River 40 is equally applicable to the present case in which the
union expressly agreed to the no-strike provision with arbitration as the
alternative to strike.41 Since it is generally recognized that the arbitra-
tion process is hamstrung by a strike,42 the present case tends to vitiate
the policy underlying section 301. Even if the Court would have been
justified initially in withholding equitable remedies under section 301, it
should not now, having enjoined the employer in Lincoln Mills, stop at an
35 The Court so distinguished Lincoln Mills in the instant case at 212. This
distinction was first advanced in Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec.
Co., 233 F.2d 85, 93-94 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1947).
See generally Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARv. L.
REv. 1268 (1959).
36 See note 8 supra.
3 T See authorities cited note 34 supra. Compare 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1958), with 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).
38 Instant case at 210-11. This distinction was explicitly rejected in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1962).
3948 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §§ 153(1) (i), (m) (1958) (compulsory
arbitration at the choice of either party). Although Congress provided for an arbi-
tration board in the Railway Labor Act, it provided no administrative agency to
enforce the act, and the courts assumed this duty. 109 U. PA. L. REv. 293, 296 (1960).
40 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
41 See Cox, supra note 20, at 255.
42 See ibid.; Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements under Taft-
Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167, 183 (1956); Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in
the Federal Courts, 59 MicH. L. Rrv. 673, 685 (1961) ; Note, Accommodation of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to other Federal Statutes, supra note 34, at 368. But see
Note, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law, The Contemporary Role of
Norris-LaGuardia, supra note 34, at 98. Most arbitrators will not hear a dispute
during a strike because they feel they cannot satisfactorily perform under these con-
ditions. Cox, supra note 20, at 255.
1962]
252 . UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.111
arbitrary point at which congressional policy is further disserved by the
resulting imbalance in the position of the two parties, employer and union.
A better approach, as the dissent suggests,43 is to weigh the desirability
of an injunction to effectuate arbitration against the harm done to the anti-
injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia. The Court has recognized that
a strike is a breach of a compulsory arbitration agreement, even in the
absence of a no-strike clause,44 and there is general agreement among
commentators that the arbitration process is ineffective if a union cannot
be prevented from striking over a grievance.45 Denial of injunctive relief
will dissuade employers from entering into these agreements because dam-
ages are too speculative to be an adequate remedy and because an employer
can rarely afford to upset delicate labor-management relations by suing
a union of his employees for money damages.4 6 Moreover, enjoining a
strike over an arbitrable grievance does not destroy the major policy under-
lying the Norris-LaGuardia Act-the avoidance of judicial evaluation of
the social and economic justification for strikes.47  An injunction under
section 301 requires only a determination of whether the dispute is cov-
ered by a compulsory arbitration provision, and could be conditioned on
employer compliance with the arbitration agreement-a "reasonable alter-
native" 48 compensating the union's loss of the strike weapon. When the
labor contract does not provide for compulsory arbitration, or the strike
is over a dispute not covered by the grievance procedure,49 injunctive relief
should be denied; the enforcement of the no-strike pledge in such circum-
stances, although possibly desirable on contract principles, does not advance
federal arbitration policy and therefore does not warrant supercession of
Norris-LaGuardia. Section 4 should be superseded only when necessary
to effectuate the federal arbitration policy articulated in section 301.
The dissent's approach is therefore consistent with the purpose and
history of section 301 of Taft-Hartley and section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia,
with earlier cases interpreting these provisions, and with the result sug-
43 See instant case at 224-25 (dissenting opinion).
44 Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
45 See note 42 supra.
4
6 See Cox, supra note 20, at 255.
4 7 Id. at 256.
4 8 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R, 353 U.S. 30, 41 (1957).
49 Compare Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines Inc., 282 F.2d
345 (10th Cir. 1960), ree'd, 370 U.S. 711 (1962), with A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Sea-
farers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). These
apparently contradictory holdings led to certiorari in the instant case. Yellow Transit
involved an application for injunctive relief from a strike when an arbitration agree-
ment provided for voluntary settlement of grievances. Injunction of the strike was
not essential to the policy of section 301 since compulsory arbitration was not involved.
Therefore the union would not have a "reasonable alternative" to the strike. Notions
of contract law, or "fairness" are not relevant, as the issuance of an injunction is
determined only by consideration of the policies of section 301 and section 4. In
Bull, the dispute did not center over a grievance that was to be settled by compulsory
arbitration, and therefore relaxation of section 4 was not warranted.
RECENT CASES
gested by most commentators.5 ° The Court's approach, although a plau-
sible interpretation of the statutory language and history, results in a
judicial perversion of the congressional goal of increased union respon-
sibility through mutual enforceability 51 of arbitration agreements. By
discouraging employers from entering into these agreements, it replaces
congressionally desired arbitration with economic strife.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE-CoPnSATIo DENiED
WHEN UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTED FROM OBSERVANCE OF SATUR-
DAY AS THE SABBATH
Claimant had been an employee of a South Carolina textile firm for
many years, working the firgt shift Monday through Friday. In 1959 her
employer changed to a six-day work week and notified claimant that she
would have to work on Saturdays. She refused because she had become
a Seventh Day Adventist in 1957 and now observed Saturday as the Sab-
bath. Upon dismissal, she was unable to obtain other work. The Em-
ployment Security Commission and the trial court denied her claim for
unemployment compensation. The Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed, one justice dissenting, holding that claimant was not available
for work and had rejected suitable work without good cause. Sherbert v.
Verner, 125 S,E.2d 737 (S.C. 1962), appeal docketed, 31 U.S.L. WEEC
3139 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 526).
Forty-seven states have eligibility provisions in their unemployment
compensation laws virtually identical to those in the South Carolina stat-
utes.1 In interpreting these provisions, three state supreme courts have
ruled on the issue in the present case; all concluded that persons whose
unemployment results from observance of Saturday as the Sabbath are
entitled to compensation.2 Of the state unemployment compensation
administrations that have taken a clear position, twenty-two out of twenty-
eight compensate such persons.3
50 See Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MicH. L. Rsv. 635,
645 (1959) ; authorities cited note 42 supra.
51 See Comment, supra note 9, at 501.
1 See ALTMA,, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 283 (1950) ; Freeman, Able To Work
and Available for Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123, 124 (1945); Menard, Refusal of Suitable
Work, 55 YALE L.J. 134, 135 (1945).
:2 Swenson v. Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W2d 709
(1954) ; In the Matter of Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956) ; Tary v. Board
of Review, 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
3 Decisions are reported in the Benefit Series, volumes 1 through 11, and the
Benefit Series Service, numbers 1 to date. This service contains only selected cases.
Not included in the statistical result are decisions based on alternative grounds and
decisions in which it appeared that the claimant was not sincere or was inconsistent
in his religious position. Included are cases involving persons who for religious
reasons refused to work on Saturdays or Sundays, or who objected to accepting
employment connected with alcoholic beverages or military projects, or who would
not join labor unions. Of the decisions in which the religious factor appeared to be
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To be eligible for benefits under the South Carolina statute, a claimant
must be "available for work"; he is disqualified if he refuses "available
suitable work." 4 Since the latter provision obviously is intended to protect
a claimant's refusal of unsuitable work, it would be senseless to hold that
one willing to accept only "suitable" work is not "available for work."
Therefore, to harmonize these provisions, the word "suitable" should be
read into the availability requirement. 5 The statutory test thus becomes,
"was the claimant available for suitable work," and the threshold question
is whether any "suitable work" existed. The statute requires: "In deter-
mining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the Com-
mission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and
morals . . . ." The court interpreted this provision to mean that work
is unsuitable only if its character "would be morally objectionable to any
employee." 7 It thereby disregarded the plain meaning of the statute,
construing the provision which specifies the individual's morals to mean
the community's morals. It did not dispute that religious tenets are com-
prehended by the word "morals"; 8 and the fact that the hours rather than
the nature of the work are objectionable to claimant should not make textile
employment any more suitable to her, however suitable it may be to the
community.
Overlooking the suitability issue, the court initially discussed claim-
ant's availability for work.9 Under South Carolina law a claimant must be
capable of doing and available for the work he has done in the past.'
0
However, stating this requirement does not further the inquiry in the
present case. Both the nature of claimant's employment and her religious
decisive, 45 of 61 decisions awarded compensation. See, e.g., 11 Benefit Series No. 8,
at 43 (Examiner, Idaho, 1947) ; 10 Benefit Series No. 2, at 147 (Appeals Examiner,
Va., 1945) (awarding compensation); 8 Benefit Series No. 4, at 131 (Referee, Pa.,
1943) ; 3 Benefit Series No. 4, at 312 (Appeals Tribunal, Iowa, 1939) (denying com-
pensation).
4 § 68-113. Benefits eligibility conditions.
An unemployed insured worker shall be eligible to receive benefits with
respect to any week only if the Commission finds that: . . . . He is able to
work and is available for work ....
§ 68-114. Disqualification for benefits.
Any insured worker shall be ineligible for benefits: .... (3) If the
Commission finds that he has failed, without good cause, (a) either to apply
for available suitable work, when so directed by the employment office or the
Commission, [or] (b) to accept available suitable work when offered him
by the employment office or the employer ....
S.C. CODE §§68-113(3), -114(3) (Supp. 1960).
5 Instant case at 748 (dissenting opinion); accord, In the Matter of Miller, 243
N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956); Note, 34 N.C.L. REv. 591, 606-07 (1956). The
court did not explicitly consider this statutory question and it is unclear whether it
accepted this view. It first said that the claimant must meet the requirement of
"unrestricted availability for work," instant case at 741; it then cited a Virginia case
that required availability only for "suitable work or employment," id. at 742.
6 S.C. CODE § 68-114(3) (a) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
7 Instant case at 744. (Emphasis added.)
S See id. at 744.
DId. at 738-42.
10 Id. at 740; Judson Mills v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 204 S.C.
37, 28 S.E.2d 535 (1944).
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notions had changed; the work she had done previously was no longer
suitable to her because working on Saturdays violated her morals and all
textile firms in the area required Saturday work.'1  The court thus found
claimant unavailable for work that was unsuitable. Of course, if claimant
had insisted on working only in the textile industry, the court's conclu-
sion that she was unavailable would have been a sound exception to the
general availability rule, for she would have restricted herself to un-
suitable work. However, claimant was willing to accept nontextile work; 2
in a sense, therefore, she was more available for work than those persons
who observe Sunday as a Sabbath since the requirement is only that the
claimant be available for the work done in the past. Moreover, since about
one hundred and fifty other Seventh Day Adventists were employed in the
area,' 3 claimant's availability was not so limited as to make it unlikely that
she would have obtained suitable work within a reasonable time.14
Whether unemployment compensation statutes should be construed
to provide compensation in the present situation involves at least three con-
siderations: the legislative purpose, the cost to employers, and the goal of
sponsoring "an attitude on the part of government that shows no par-
tiality to any one [religious] group." 15
The court relied on the argument that the purpose of the South
Carolina statute is to protect against unemployment caused by industrial
instability, not by personal restrictions on availability.' 6 It grouped the
case before it with earlier cases which denied compensation to persons
who became unavailable for nonreligious personal reasons-for example, a
mother who restricted her availability to certain hours because she had to
care for her children.' 7 The statute appears, however, to require a dis-
"Instant case at 741.
12 Brief of Appellant, p. 5, instant case.
13 Instant case at 750 (dissenting opinion).
14 A different question would be raised if claimant's religion placed "unreason-
able! restrictions on her availability, see the present court's discussion, at 744-45, of
Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709
(1954), or if claimant restricted her availability to an industry that could not supply
her with suitable work. If the present court had found that textile work had become
unsuitable for claimant, as it should have done, it might have modified the previous
South Carolina rule and required cliamant to be available for suitable nontextile work.
15 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
16 Instant case at 739-40. The court repeatedly quoted language indicating that
changes in personal circumstances do not justify unemployment compensation. Instant
case at 740, 742. However, there is no indication that this court would have awarded
compensation had claimant been a life-long rather than a converted Seventh Day
Adventist.
17 Instant case at 742-43. In equating religious with nonreligious personal rea-
sons, the court relied in part on the case of Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146
Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643, appeal dismissed sub noin. Kut v. Bureau of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 329 U.S. 669 (1946). Yet the later case of Tary v. Board of
Review, 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954), reaching an opposite conclusion,
granted compensation, and distinguished Kut as being based on statutory provisions
no longer in effect. Thus, six years after the Ohio court buried Kit, the South
Carolina court resurrected it. More significantly, the South Carolina Supreme Court
chose to follow Kut, which was based on statutory provisions very different from
those in South Carolina, and refused to follow Tary, which interpreted virtually
identical statutory language.
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tinction between religious and other personal reasons for restricting avail-
ability. It commands that morals be considered in determining avail-
ability; ' 8 it does not require the consideration of factors such as family
obligations.
The added cost to employers is a factor that is difficult to assess
accurately. However, many states do award compensation in cases like
the present one,19 apparently finding no financial barrier. In any event,
the present court did not even mention the cost factor in arriving at its
decision.
The third factor, that government should be scrupulously impartial to
different religious groups, not only tips the balance in favor of compensa-
tion, but also raises a constitutional question-whether the denial of
compensation infringed the free exercise of claimant's religion.2 The
Supreme Court has indicated that in determining the scope of the free
exercise clause of .the first amendment, the conflicting interests of the
state and the individual must be balanced against each other to determine
which is to prevail.2 ' A compelling state interest in one case might, there-
fore, warrant an infringement of the free exercise of religion, whereas in
another case a similar or lesser infringement might fall if no significant
state interest justifies it.
Most closely in point are the Sunday blue law cases. In both situ-
ations a state law indirectly makes it economically disadvantageous for
18 Forty-seven of the fifty states require that morals be considered. ALTmAN,
AvAzAl aITY FOR WoRx 283 (1950).
19 See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
20 The first amendment "commands that . . . [a state] cannot hamper its citizens
in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual
Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it,
from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Recently the Chief Justice and three other members
of the Court pointed out that discrimination may violate the Constitution even though
it is indirect. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). In finding no consti-
tutional violation, the present court cited Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146
Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643, appeal dismissed sub nom. Kut v. Bureau of Unemploy-
ment Compensation, 329 U.S. 669 (1946), a case which is no longer law in Ohio.
See note 17 supra. Only one court decision, Betts v. Giovine, 89 Benefit Series Serv.
11 (King County, Wash. Super. Ct., 1957), has relied on the federal constitution
to determine that a state unemployment law must provide compensation to religious
minorities which conscientiously limited their members' availability for work. The
cases cited note 2 spra relied exclusively on statutory interpretation. In Betts, the
court declared:
The freedom of religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, . . . [makes] unconstitutional any
construction of . . . the Employment Security Act that would make ineligible,
and deny benefits to, a claimant because of his unwillingness to accept employ-
ment requiring him to work on his Sabbath, where such unwillingness is
based on his individual and sincere belief in, and adherence to, a religious
tenet of his church.
Betts v. Giovine, supra at 14. That case also involved a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to work on Saturdays.
21 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940); see Braunfeld v. Brown,
supra note 20, at 613-14 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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certain persons to observe Saturday as the Sabbath. Under the blue laws,
Jewish retailers must choose between doing business six days a week and
observance of their Sabbath.2 In the present case, after choosing her
religion over employment, claimant was required by the state to elect
between her religion and unemployment compensation.
In upholding the blue laws,23 the Supreme Court reached the merits
of the free exercise issue in only one case-Braunfeld v. Brown.2 4  Major
factors in that decision undoubtedly were the Court's recognition of the
desire of the states to have a universal day of rest 2 5 and the necessity of
overturning the whole program of Sunday regulation if it found a viola-
tion of the Constitution 2 6 The Court, three Justices dissenting,27 held
that these considerations justified the economic disadvantage placed on
Orthodox Jews by the blue laws. However shallow may have been the
state interest in Braunfeld,' in the present case there appears to be no
significant state interest to counterbalance the indirect discrimination
against Seventh Day Adventists, who are denied compensation even though
willing to accept any otherwise suitable job not requiring Saturday work.
While the blue laws cannot fully achieve their purpose without causing
economic hardship to those persons whose Sabbath is Saturday, the tin-
employment compensation program need not be upset in order to assure
Seventh Day Adventists treatment equal to that received by the rest of the
community. The absence of a significant countervailing interest could well
justify a holding by the Supreme Court that the free exercise of claimant's
religion has been infringed.
2 2 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra note 20, at 611 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.);
see McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 21, at 577 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Some
states mitigate their blue laws by exempting persons who observe another day as
the Sabbath. E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.855(7) (1957).
2 3 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) ; Braun-
feld y. Rrown, supra note 20; Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
McG0ivwn v. Maryland, supra note 21.
24 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
25 See id. at 614 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
26 See id. at 606 (opiniqn of Warren, C.J.).
2 7 Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart found a conflict with the free exercise
clause. Id. at 576-78, 610, 616. In view of the factors discussed in the text, and the
fact that two members of the Braunfeld majority, Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker,
are no longer on the CourL the decision on the free exercise clause could well be
different should the question posed by the instant case be considered by the Court.
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